

UNCLASSIFIED Rec. related to the deleted text

DENIED IN FULL B1, 1.5(B), 1.5(D)

E263

PAGE 01 OF 03 BEIJIN 10884 00 OF 04 161000Z 015012 SS06650 ACTION: EAP (02)

BEIJIN 10884 00 OF 04 161000Z 015012 ON THE BROADER BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. END SUMMARY.

SS06650

INFO: D (01) P (02) T (01) C (01) SSO (01) SSI (01) INR (01) OCT (01) SP (01) PA (01) L (01) SB (01) MR (01) PM (01) DODE (01) SHP (01) ACDA (01) SSSB (01) 16/1033Z A3 HS (TOTAL COPIES: 021)

4. A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION TO UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW'S ONGOING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CHINESE ON WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL SINO-U.S. RELATIONSHIP BUT ALSO IN PROTECTING U.S. INTERESTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. IN THE CONTEXT OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS, WE OFFER BELOW OUR SENSE OF THE CHINESE POSITION ON SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES. OVER THE PAST MONTHS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY HEARD THE POSITIONS OUTLINED BELOW REPEATED BY CONTACTS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF THINK TANKS; WE ARE THUS REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THESE POSITIONS REPRESENT CURRENT PRC POLICY.

Handwritten notes and initials: SB, DP, MAR, SP, RSR, SBT, EG, etc.

OCT PASS INRE NSCE CIAE INFO: X (01) SS (01) JSR (01) EAP (01) 16/1024Z A1 WW ACTION SS-00

TO NP INFO D PA: NP/INA MA: NP/NST GC: D/GAC D/M: NP/ATD PPG: VI D/SVC: A/CS

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /001W -5ASCE3 161

P 160953Z APR 91 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3772 INFO RUEHIM/AIT TAIPEI 4634 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY TOKYO

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE THEORY

CONFIDENTIAL BEIJING 10884

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PARM, MHUC, XNMP, PK, IN, NK, CH SUBJECT: PROLIFERATION ISSUES: THE VIEW FROM BEIJING LOOKS GRIM

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

EXDIS

5. WHILE NOT A SIGNATORY OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, THE PRC HAS FREQUENTLY STATED IN PUBLIC THAT IT SUPPORTS THE THREE GOALS OF THE NPT: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES; REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENALS WORLDWIDE; AND PROMOTING THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. THE CHINESE SAY THAT AS A RESULT OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR THESE GOALS THEY HAVE DEVELOPED THREE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THEIR NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES: 1) THEY WILL ONLY COOPERATE ON PROJECTS WHICH FALL UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS; 2) THEY WILL NOT COOPERATE ON PROJECTS GEARED TOWARDS WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT; AND 3) THEY WILL NOT COOPERATE ON

PROJECTS GEARED TOWARDS THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO THIRD COUNTRIES.

6. CHINESE OFFICIALS AND ANALYSTS HAVE INSISTED TO US THAT THESE PRINCIPLES APPLY TO CHINESE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH ALL COUNTRIES, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING PAKISTAN AND ALGERIA. THEY ASSERT THAT THEY DO NOT WORK ON ANY PROJECTS IN EITHER OF THOSE

TWO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY IAEA SAFEGUARDS, POINTING OUT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE NEW POWER REACTOR WHICH THEY HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN WILL COME UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS.

PRC ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOUTH ASIAN PROLIFERATION

7. BEIJING'S "PRINCIPLES" REGARDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION HAVE NOT TRANSLATED INTO A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE CONCRETE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS SPECIFIC NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CONCERNS. SOUTH ASIA IS A CASE IN POINT. OUR CHINESE INTERLOCUTORS HAVE REJECTED THE PERSISTENT REPORTS THAT THE PRC IS ASSISTING THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. OUR CONTACTS FURTHER MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY SEE LITTLE ROLE FOR CHINA TO PLAY IN TRYING TO STEM THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TIDE IN SOUTH ASIA.

8. THE CHINESE DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE PAKISTANI

PROGRAM PROVOKE A FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WITH NEW DELHI. THAT BEING SAID, BEIJING VIEWS THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM AS PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE, A LOGICAL RESPONSE TO INDIA'S 1974 EXPLOSION OF A "PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE" AND PERHAPS A CHECK TO WHAT

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

Table with columns EQIA/PA and Mandatory Review, containing options like Release, Exclso, Dony and their corresponding review actions.

Exemptions ARP Action Cert. Date 100603

WE MUST CLEARLY WORK THROUGH OUR PRIORITIES IN DEALING WITH THE CHINESE PROLIFERATION ISSUES, LEAVING NO DOUBT

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN

DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2002 200100469

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.6(6)

DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 APR 2016

383:00 0031,9

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9. PRC OFFICIALS AND RESEARCHERS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO US THAT CHINA BELIEVES RESOLVING THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS IS A TASK PRIMARILY FOR THE SUPERPOWERS. ONLY MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON, THE CHINESE MAINTAIN, HAVE THE NECESSARY INFLUENCE IN THE SUB-CONTINENT TO BROKER AN AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, BEIJING EMPHASIZES THAT THE PRC'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL WILL NOT BE A TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION IN TALKS AIMED AT DEFUSING THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEM.

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10. HERE IN BEIJING, CHINESE OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN UNRESPONSIVE TO OUR ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THEM ON SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THEY HAVE OFFERED NO SUGGESTIONS REGARDING ANY MULTILATERAL SOLUTION TO

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

THE PROBLEM AND HAVE ADMITTED THAT THEY HAVE NOT RAISED THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WITH THE INDIANS. SEVERAL OFFICIALS HAVE STATED THAT CHINA WOULD BE WILLING TO "CONSIDER" ANY SUGGESTIONS WE MIGHT ADVANCE FOR A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO THE ISSUE; WE TAKE THESE STATEMENTS AS A POLITE DIG AT US FOR NOT HAVING ADVANCED A CONCRETE FORMULATION WHICH WOULD INTEREST THE INDIANS WITHOUT AFFECTING IN ANY WAY CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL, RATHER THAN AS A SERIOUS OFFER TO GET INVOLVED IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OVER SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION

EXD IS

UPPERED UP THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. "THE KEY LIES WITH INDIA." AND, INDIA IS RELUCTANT TO GIVE UP ITS RIGHT TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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NORTH KOREA AND THE IAEA

R1

15. THE CHINESE FURTHER MAINTAIN THAT THEY HAVE PUT INTO PLACE EFFECTIVE CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRECURSORS, IN LINE WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1925 GENEVA CONVENTION.

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MISSILE PROLIFERATION

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THE
CHINESE TRACK RECORD REFLECTS AN AGGRESSIVE
PRAGMATISM -- CSS-2'S TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR BIG MONEY,
SILKWORKS TO BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ, MISSILES AND MISSILE

TECHNOLOGY TO PAKISTAN FOR MONEY AND TO BALANCE
INDIA, AND NO MISSILES TO KUWAIT (PROBABLY TOO SMALL
A COUNTRY).

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