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DEPT PLS PASS DOD AND CINCPAC INCLUDING FOR POLAD

DOD PLEASE TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR CNO, UDSP,
AND RICH ARMITAGE

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TEXT

TAGS: PREL, CH, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET DCM ASKS ABOUT U.S. SHIP VISIT TO
SHANGHAI; COMMENTS ON SUMMIT AND CAMBODIA

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT. IN A NOT VERY SUBTLE "PERSONAL" CALL ON CHARGE TOMSEN, APRIL 22, SOVIET DCM FEDOTOV UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO CONFIRM THE ARRIVAL DATE FOR THE U.S. NAVAL SHIP VISIT TO SHANGHAI. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IF THE SHIPS WERE THERE AT THE SAME TIME AS GORBACHEV, THIS WOULD PRESENT AN UNDESIRABLE U.S. POSTURE OF "CONFRONTATION" IN THE U.S.-SINO-SOVIET TRIANGLE. AT ANOTHER POINT, HE STATED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR GORBACHEV TO BE IN SHANGHAI AT THE SAME TIME THE U.S. WAS DEMONSTRATING ITS MILITARY STRENGTH. CHARGE REPLIED THAT IT WAS U.S. POLICY NOT TO COMMENT ON NAVAL MOVEMENTS; HE THEREFORE WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND TO FEDOTOV'S INQUIRY. WHEN FEDOTOV PERSISTED, CHARGE ADDED THAT WITH SINO-SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS ALL IMPROVING, HE DID NOT THEN SEE ANY CONFRONTATIONAL ASPECT REGARDING SHIP VISITS--RUMORS WERE AFOOT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT CONDUCT A SHIP VISIT TO CHINA THEMSELVES IN THE FUTURE. AT ONE POINT, CHARGE REMINDED FEDOTOV THAT CHINESE WERE THE HOST FOR SHIP VISITS TO CHINA. FEDOTOV STATED THAT GORBACHEV'S OUT-OF-BEIJING STOP HAD NOT BEEN FINALLY DECIDED. THERE WERE THREE CHOICES: SHANGHAI, XIAN OR GUANGZHOU. ON CAMBODIA, FEDOTOV CONFIRMED ROGACHEV HAD ARRIVED LAST SATURDAY AND THAT THE CHINESE HAD RESPONDED WITH THEIR VERSION OF A DRAFT JOINT SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, BUT SAID THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY PROGRESS ON CAMBODIA. FEDOTOV CHARACTERIZED AS "RATHER FLEXIBLE" THE VIETNAMESE/PRK POSITION OF A FOUR-POWER ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN TO ORGANIZE THE ELECTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, NOTING THAT THE SIHANOUK-HUN SEN MAY 2 MEETING WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT. HE ALSO SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE MIGHT MEET AGAIN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. EXCHANGES ON AFGHANISTAN WILL BE

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REPORTED SEPTEL.

3. WE ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS WILL (IF THEY HAVE NOT ALREADY) APPROACH THE CHINESE TO SEEK INFORMATION ON AND POSTPONEMENT OF THE U.S. SHIP VISIT TO SHANGHAI AT THE SAME TIME AS GORBACHEV IS IN SHANGHAI. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, EMBASSY DOES NOT PLAN TO CONVEY THIS APPARENT SOVIET DEMARCHE TO THE CHINESE

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IS OF COURSE POSSIBLE THAT THE CHINESE THEMSELVES MAY ASK TO DISCUSS THE TIMING OF OUR SHIP VISIT TO SHANGHAI AND REQUEST POSTPONEMENT. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE CONTINUE TO STAND PAT UNTIL THEY DO -- THEIR DECISION NOT TO DISCUSS THE VISIT WITH US WOULD MEAN THEY WISH IT TO GO AHEAD, A DECISION WHICH WE SHOULD RESPECT. FEDOTOV'S COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS MAY PRESS THE CHINESE FOR XIAN OR GUANGZHOU FOR GORBACHEV'S OUT-OF-BEIJING STOP. WHATEVER THE CASE, A U.S. SHIP VISIT ON OR SOON AFTER THE EVE OF GORBACHEV'S DEPARTURE, LIKE THE PRESIDENT'S EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL FEBRUARY VISIT TO CHINA AND NPC CHAIRMAN WAN LI AND FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON, WILL MAINTAIN ATTENTION ON STURDY AND IMPROVING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS EVEN AS THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE HOLD THEIR SUMMIT. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

THE SUMMIT AND THE U.S. SHIP VISIT TO SHANGHAI

4. SOVIET DCM FEDOTOV CALLED ON CHARGE TOMSEN AFTERNOON OF APRIL 24. TO ASK ABOUT POSSIBLE U.S. SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIJING 11173

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NAVAL VISIT TO SHANGHAI MAY 17. CHARGE REPLIED IT IS U.S. POLICY NOT TO COMMENT ON NAVAL MOVEMENTS. FEDOTOV ASKED IF WHAT CHARGE MEANT WAS HE WOULD NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY THE ARRIVAL OF THE THREE

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SHIPS TO SHANGHAI. CHARGE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, SAYING U.S. POLICY, PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, IS NOT TO COMMENT ON OUR NAVAL MOVEMENTS.

5. FEDOTOV ASKED IF THIS WOULD NOT PRODUCE A "CONFRONTATION IN THE SINO-SOVIET-U.S. TRIANGLE." CHARGE REPLIED THAT SHIP VISITS GENERALLY SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE CURRENT TENOR OF RELATIONS ON EACH SIDE OF THE TRIANGLE WHICH ARE GOOD. FEDOTOV SAID THAT IF GORBACHEV IS IN SHANGHAI AT THE SAME TIME AS U.S. SHIPS, IT MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF CONFRONTATION. CHARGE AGAIN REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT COMMENT AT ALL ON TIMING OF U.S. NAVAL MOVEMENTS. HE AGAIN NOTED THAT SHIP VISITS GENERALLY SHOULD NOT AFFECT RELATIONS -- THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. WANT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND WE BOTH WANT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA. CHARGE ALSO SAID WE HAD HEAR A RUMOR THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PLANNING A FUTURE NAVAL VISIT TO SHANGHAI.

6. PERSISTING, FEDOTOV AGAIN SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR GORBACHEV TO BE IN A LOCATION WHERE THE U.S. AT THE SAME TIME WAS DEMONSTRATING MILITARY STRENGTH. CHARGE RESPONDED BY REPEATING HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT, WHILE ALSO NOTING THAT, AS FEDOTOV WAS AWARE, THE CHINESE WERE THE HOST FOR ANY U.S. SHIP VISIT TO CHINA. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUESTION, FEDOTOV REPLIED THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON WHERE GORBACHEV WOULD GO OUTSIDE OF BEIJING HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE. SHANGHAI IS ONE OF THE CHOICES, BUT THERE ARE TWO OTHERS: XIAN AND GUANGZHOU. FEDOTOV CONCLUDED THIS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT HE WAS MAKING A "PERSONAL" INQUIRY.

CAMBODIA

7. CHARGE THEN ASKED IF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ROGACHEV HAD ARRIVED. FEDOTOV CONFIRMED THAT HE ARRIVED ON SATURDAY, APRIL 22. CHARGE ASKED IF FEDOTOV COULD SAY ANYTHING ABOUT CAMBODIA. FEDOTOV REPLIED THAT THE CHINESE HAD FINALLY COME FORTH WITH THEIR DRAFT VERSION OF A SUMMIT JOINT COMMUNIQUE, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT IN THE CHINESE POSITION ON CAMBODIA.

8. FEDOTOV NEXT COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION ON CAMBODIA WAS CHANGING, STATING THAT AMERICA WAS NOW PLANNING ON GIVING MILITARY AID TO THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE. TOMSEN REPLIED THAT THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON FOR SOME TIME, AS FEDOTOV HAD NO DOUBT SEEN IN PRESS REPORTS, BUT HE WAS UNAWARE PRECISELY WHAT CONCLUSION HAD BEEN REACHED. B1

9. CHARGE STATED THE U.S. POSITION WAS A DESIRE FOR

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A COMPLETE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA, AND INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION TO VERIFY THE WITHDRAWAL. ADDITIONALLY, THE U.S. WANTED MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE KHMER ROUGE DID NOT COME BACK TO POWER AGAIN. CHARGE, RESPONDING TO FEDOTOV'S QUESTION, STATED THAT THE CHINESE POSITION SUPPORTED AN INTERIM QUADRIPARTITE COALITION GOVERNMENT, WITH SIHANOUK AS THE HEAD, WHILE THE VIETNAMESE WERE MANEUVERING TO KEEP THE PRK ADMINISTRATION IN POWER.

10. FEDOTOV RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS NOT ONLY THE VIETNAMESE POSITION, BUT THE "CAMBODIAN" POSITION AS WELL. SPECIFICALLY, THERE WOULD BE THE FORMATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN OF ALL FACTIONS TO ORGANIZE THE ELECTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. FEDOTOV DESCRIBED THIS AS A "RATHER FLEXIBLE" POSITION. THE PRK WAS AGREEING THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED
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AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, UNDER A FOUR-FACTION ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN, AND THE PRK WOULD ABIDE BY THE RESULTS.

11. FEDOTOV SAID HE HAD HEARD THE CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE ARE TRYING TO AGREE ON A SECOND ROUND OF TALKS, WHICH HE FELT MIGHT BE HELD THIS WEEK OR NEXT. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUESTION, FEDOTOV SAID THERE WAS NO VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THE SUMMIT BEFORE ROGACHEV ARRIVED IN BEIJING; RATHER, SOVIET-VIETNAMESE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONTINUING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. HE PREDICTED THAT NGUYEN VAN LINH OR ANOTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL MIGHT VISIT MOSCOW IN THE UPCOMING WEEKS. TOMSEN ASKED IF FEDOTOV THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON CAMBODIA DURING THE SUMMIT. FEDOTOV REPLIED, "I DON'T KNOW; PLEASE DON'T ASK." HE SAID NOW THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE WITHDRAWING, THE FOCUS WAS ON AN INTERNAL SOLUTION. THEN HE REMARKED PLAINTIVELY, "BUT WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THIS NOT MOVING FORWARD. WHAT CAN WE DO? ALL WE CAN DO IS ASK OUR FRIENDS IN VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, AND THEY ARE DOING IT," CHARGE STATED THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAD IN RECENT YEARS ANNOUNCED MANY TROOP

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WITHDRAWALS FROM CAMBODIA WHICH WERE NOT CARRIED OUT. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO EXPECT FULFILLMENT OF VIETNAMESE COMMITMENTS--WE HAD TO SEE TANGIBLE RESULTS.

12. CHARGE ASKED IF FEDOTOV KNEW THE COMPOSITION OF THE GORBACHEV DELEGATION. FEDOTOV RESPONDED THAT DEFINITELY SHEVARDNADZE AND ROGACHEV WOULD BE COMING, AND ALSO THE SOVIET CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, BUT BEYOND THAT HE COULD NOT COMMENT. CHARGE ASKED IF ECONOMIC-RELATED MINISTERS WOULD BE REPRESENTED. FEDOTOV RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE QUITE LOGICAL FOR MASLUKOV, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR MINISTERS, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION, AND JOINT CHAIRMAN OF THE SINO-SOVIET ECONOMIC COMMISSION, TO BE INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION.

13. AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN TOMSEN AND FEDOTOV ON AFGHANISTAN WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL. TOMSEN

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

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