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SYSTEM II  
90373

April 26, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 305

OBJECTIVES AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT (X)

I have accepted General Secretary Gorbachev's invitation for a Moscow Summit meeting beginning May 29 and ending June 2. My visit to the Soviet Union will be preceded by a stop in Helsinki and followed by a stop in London. My specific objectives for the Soviet and Western European portions of this trip are listed below. The overall objectives of the trip may be summarized as follows:

-- to demonstrate the success of this Administration's approach to the Soviet Union based on the principles of strength, realism, and Western unity;

-- to consolidate the gains made by this Administration on the four-part agenda with the Soviet Union and to press for further progress, particularly on attainment as soon as possible of a START agreement which fully meets our security concerns, significant improvement in the Soviet Union's human rights performance, and resolution of regional conflicts beyond Afghanistan;

-- to reaffirm to both the Soviets and West Europeans that the United States remains fully committed to overcoming the postwar East-West division of Europe, and that broad progress toward this goal is the best guarantee of long-term stability and improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. (X)

My visit to the Soviet Union should not be seen as a dialogue only with the Soviet government, but also as a way of communicating with the Soviet people. I want to emphasize throughout my trip that the democratic values that make our country great are those toward which much of the world--including, we hope, the Soviet Union--is moving. At the same time, I wish to make clear that, while we welcome promises of reform within the USSR, the policies of the United States and the West toward Moscow must be based on Soviet deeds rather than words. Only a realistic approach can pass the test of time and contribute to the stable development of the East-West relationship. (X)

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Specific Objectives in the Soviet Union

My specific objectives in the Soviet portion of my trip include:

- to stress the importance of progress in Soviet human rights performance across the board -- an increased rate of emigration, family reunification, release of prisoners of conscience, and especially, changes in laws and practices that will produce greater respect for individual liberties -- as a means of furthering overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations;
- to make maximum practical progress toward an agreement for a fifty percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, while making clear to the Soviet side that we have no deadline and that the pressures of time cannot be used to obtain an agreement which does not fully meet our security concerns;
- to follow through on the progress made on the regional agenda in the signing of the Geneva instruments. This includes emphasizing to the Soviets the importance of completing a prompt withdrawal from Afghanistan, reaffirming our objective of a genuinely independent, non-aligned Afghanistan in which the Afghan people are free to determine their own future, and actively engaging the Soviets to be helpful in resolving other regional issues on our agenda;
- to consolidate progress and move forward on bilateral issues, including exchanges and, where warranted, economic relations;
- to press for progress on all other matters of interest on our four-part agenda and to assure the Soviets that we are prepared to continue working actively on this agenda through the end of this Administration. ~~AM~~

Specific Objectives in Western Europe

My objectives in Western Europe include emphasizing to our friends and Allies:

- that the U.S. gives, and will continue to give, the highest priority to shared Western interests and security concerns in our bilateral dialogue with the Soviets;
- that Western unity and strength are the twin pillars which have proven their success in negotiation with the Soviets;

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-- that we must guard against exaggerated expectations on the future pace and achievement of U.S.-Soviet relations or the reform process underway in the Soviet Union, but be willing to move forward as quickly as the situation allows;

-- that we will do our part to ensure continuity and stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. ~~to~~

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WASHINGTON

May 27, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 307REVIEW OF UNITED STATES ARMS REDUCTION POSITIONS  
IN PREPARATION FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT (U)

Based on the current status of arms reduction negotiations, as well as the views of my senior advisors, this NSDD sets out U.S. arms reduction positions and objectives for the May 29 - June 2, 1988 summit meeting in Moscow. This NSDD is not intended as a comprehensive statement of U.S. arms reduction policy; except where specifically noted, previous U.S. positions and previous guidance remain valid. (S)

Substantive arms reduction discussions in Moscow should focus on START, Defense and Space, Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, and issues concerning the ABM Treaty review. In the areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons and conventional forces arms control, barring unforeseen circumstances, we will limit ourselves to reviewing and recording progress made elsewhere and to signing those nuclear testing agreements negotiated in Geneva. (S)

START (U)

In Moscow we will seek the following:

- We will continue to advocate a legally binding sublimit of 3300 ICBM RVs and will discuss how to record the current Soviet intentions with regard to their program.
- We will provide the Soviets details of our proposed verification scheme for mobile ICBMs based upon the decisions reflected in guidance issued on my behalf by the National Security Council staff on May 24, 1988. Based on Soviet receptiveness to this verification approach, I will make the decision in Moscow whether to discuss specific numerical limits on mobile ICBMs and, if so, what limits to propose.
- If warranted by Soviet movement in other areas, I am prepared to agree to allow testing and modernization of silo-based heavy ICBMs subject to appropriate restrictions on the modernization of such missiles (but not on other ICBM modernization) and subject to the United States having an equal right to heavy ICBMs.

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Building upon the Reykjavik formula for heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs or SRAMs, we will seek to resolve additional issues concerning air-breathing weapons in a single, integrated package as follows:

- While continuing to prefer a counting rule of 10 ALCMs per bomber, if the Soviets accept our approach to counting rules, we can accept an outcome which meets the following criteria:
    - For the U.S. a counting rule of no more than 10 ALCMs per B-2;
    - For existing Soviet bombers a counting rule of no less than 6 ALCMs per BEAR-H and no less than 8 ALCMs per Blackjack;
    - Provisions for agreeing on counting rules for future bomber types.
  - No sublimit on ALCMs or bomber weapons;
  - No restrictions on conventionally-armed cruise missiles;
  - 1000 km range cut-off for counting nuclear-armed ALCM (acceptable only if the Soviets agree to the remaining elements of our proposal);
  - Acceptance of the U.S. position on bomber and bomber weapon distinguishability and verification;
  - No constraints on ALCM inventory; and
  - Acceptance of the limited right to convert ALCM bombers to non-ALCM bombers and non-ALCM bombers to conventional bombers set forth in the U.S. Draft of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
- On sea-launched cruise missiles, if the Soviets appear interested in moving from their current position to a declaratory approach, we will base such an approach on reciprocal non-binding declarations or acquisition plans for all nuclear-armed SLCMs regardless of their range. If such a scheme were agreed to, the United States would declare it has no plans to acquire more than 1500 nuclear-armed SLCMs.
- We will continue the expanded data exchange begun in Geneva. (S)

In implementing these decisions, our priorities should be:

- First priority. Resolving issues related to the joint summit statement/separate START statement as required.
- Second priority. Seeking Soviet agreement to the ALCM position set forth above.
- Third priority. Setting forth additional details of the U.S. approach to mobile ICBM verification.

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Fourth priority. Continuing the expanded data exchange. (S)

Soviet ABM Treaty Non-compliance and the ABM Treaty Review (U)

We will reaffirm in Moscow our long-standing concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. We will make it clear that we will not sign any strategic arms agreements, either in START or in Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement or destruction of the radar. (S)

The third five-year review of the ABM Treaty must be conducted by October, 1988. We will not attempt to conduct the review in Moscow on the margins of the summit, nor will we plan on delaying it past October. Within those parameters, interagency consideration of options for the timing and forum of the review should be expedited. Taking into account developments during discussions in Moscow, especially with regard to Krasnoyarsk, I would like to be able to decide the U.S. position on the timing and forum of such a review as soon as possible following the Moscow summit. (S)

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